The complexity of relationships among Gulf monarchy states has led to continuing wars, conflicts with up to hundreds of thousands of casualties, and funding of armed violent groups to promote the interests of the various states.
Which Gulf states have backed armed groups abroad?
Analyses of proxy wars and regional interventions identify multiple Gulf monarchies and Iran as backing or arming non‑state or semi‑state armed actors in other countries (often alongside Turkey, Western states, and others)
The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states are a political and economic union of six Arab nations bordering the Persian Gulf: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Established in 1981, this bloc focuses on regional cooperation, security, and economic development.
Saudi Arabia
Led or co‑led coalitions and backed armed factions in Yemen and Syria, among other conflicts, as part of broader regional rivalry, particularly with Iran.
In Sudan, Saudi Arabia has been aligned with the regular Sudanese Armed Forces, providing political and some military support in a war where both sides commit abuses.
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Supported and armed local militias and political factions in Yemen, southern Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia (e.g., drone support and training to Ethiopian forces), and has been repeatedly reported as supplying weapons to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) despite mediation efforts.
Has built or used military outposts and bases in Yemen, Eritrea, Somalia, Chad, Libya, and Egypt, enabling projection of force through partners and proxies.
Qatar
Along with Saudi Arabia, Qatar was implicated in financial and material support to various Syrian opposition and Islamist factions in the early and mid‑years of the Syrian civil war, with charitable and private channels playing a role; all four key GCC players (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE) later tightened counter‑terror financing rules under international pressure.
Has also provided financial support to Sudanese actors and been part of broader Gulf competition for influence there.
Kuwait and other GCC states
Kuwait has been cited as a jurisdiction from which private fundraising for extremist groups in Syria and Iraq originated, prompting new charity regulations and enforcement mechanisms.
Other GCC members (e.g., Bahrain) have played smaller but sometimes supportive roles in the broader Saudi‑ and UAE‑led regional alignments.
Iran (not a GCC member but a key Gulf actor)
Provides extensive support (financing, arms, training) to non‑state armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen, contributing to prolonged conflicts and cross‑border attacks.
Because these interventions usually occur within complex multi‑sided wars, responsibility is shared with local actors and other external powers (e.g., Turkey, the U.S., Russia, European states), and most sources describe “Gulf‑backed” or “Iran‑backed” groups as one part of a larger conflict system.
Casualties linked to these proxy conflicts (rough orders of magnitude)
No authoritative dataset attributes a precise casualty count to each state’s funding or arms shipments; instead, we have total deaths in specific wars where Gulf or Iranian backing has been significant.
Sudan (RSF vs Sudanese Armed Forces, with UAE, Saudi, Egypt, Qatar, Iran involved to varying degrees)
ACLED data cited in 2025 reported about 28,700 fatalities, including over 7,500 civilians killed in direct attacks, with other estimates (BBC) putting total deaths potentially as high as 150,000.
Reports argue Emirati arms and support to the RSF, and Saudi support to the army, have “exacerbated” and prolonged the conflict, but they share responsibility with local commanders and other external backers.
Yemen (Saudi‑ and UAE‑led coalition vs Houthis, with Iran backing Houthis)
The Yemen war is widely described as a major proxy confrontation between Saudi Arabia/UAE and Iran, with each side supporting local armed groups.
One 2024 review of proxy wars notes Yemen as among the “most devastating” current proxy wars, with “around 100,000 killed in the last five years of war” and enormous humanitarian fallout, though this figure includes all sides and does not isolate deaths strictly from Gulf or Iranian support.
Syria (Saudi, Qatar, UAE, Iran, Turkey, U.S., Russia all backing different factions)
The Syrian civil war, a textbook multi‑state proxy battleground, has produced enormous human costs. The Syria Observatory for Human Rights reported about 560,000 deaths over seven years from 2011–2018, many civilian.
A policy paper on GCC foreign assistance notes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE were all implicated in financing extremist networks in Syria after 2011, even as they later tightened controls.
Horn of Africa and neighboring conflicts (Ethiopia/Tigray, Somalia, Libya, etc.)
The UAE has been cited as supplying drones and training to the Ethiopian government during the Tigray conflict, and supporting various factions in Libya and Somalia, contributing to battle outcomes and prolongation of wars, though casualty counts are usually reported at the conflict level, not broken down by external patron.
Because these wars feature overlapping backers and complex local dynamics, credible researchers warn against simple “X state caused Y deaths” statements; rather, Gulf and Iranian support often enables and intensifies conflicts that already exist, significantly raising lethality and duration, but in conjunction with many other actors.
Why precise attribution is difficult
Casualty databases (ACLED, Syria Observatory, UN, etc.) track who was killed, where, and by which armed actor, not which foreign state financed which bullet or missile.
Funding is often covert or deniable, routed through charities, intelligence services, or private intermediaries, making quantitative links between specific financial flows and specific deaths highly uncertain.
Many conflicts (Yemen, Syria, Sudan) have multiple foreign backers on each side, plus local war economies, so responsibility is diffuse and political narratives about blame are contested.tcf+1
Saudi Arabia
Led or co‑led coalitions and backed armed factions in Yemen and Syria, among other conflicts, as part of broader regional rivalry, particularly with Iran.
In Sudan, Saudi Arabia has been aligned with the regular Sudanese Armed Forces, providing political and some military support in a war where both sides commit abuses.
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Supported and armed local militias and political factions in Yemen, southern Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia (e.g., drone support and training to Ethiopian forces), and has been repeatedly reported as supplying weapons to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) despite mediation efforts.
Has built or used military outposts and bases in Yemen, Eritrea, Somalia, Chad, Libya, and Egypt, enabling projection of force through partners and proxies.
Qatar
Along with Saudi Arabia, Qatar was implicated in financial and material support to various Syrian opposition and Islamist factions in the early and mid‑years of the Syrian civil war, with charitable and private channels playing a role; all four key GCC players (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE) later tightened counter‑terror financing rules under international pressure.
Has also provided financial support to Sudanese actors and been part of broader Gulf competition for influence there.
Kuwait and other GCC states
Kuwait has been cited as a jurisdiction from which private fundraising for extremist groups in Syria and Iraq originated, prompting new charity regulations and enforcement mechanisms.
Other GCC members (e.g., Bahrain) have played smaller but sometimes supportive roles in the broader Saudi‑ and UAE‑led regional alignments.
Iran (not a GCC member but a key Gulf actor)
Provides extensive support (financing, arms, training) to non‑state armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen, contributing to prolonged conflicts and cross‑border attacks.
Because these interventions usually occur within complex multi‑sided wars, responsibility is shared with local actors and other external powers (e.g., Turkey, the U.S., Russia, European states), and most sources describe “Gulf‑backed” or “Iran‑backed” groups as one part of a larger conflict system.
Casualties linked to these proxy conflicts (rough orders of magnitude)
No authoritative dataset attributes a precise casualty count to each state’s funding or arms shipments; instead, we have total deaths in specific wars where Gulf or Iranian backing has been significant.
Sudan (RSF vs Sudanese Armed Forces, with UAE, Saudi, Egypt, Qatar, Iran involved to varying degrees)
ACLED data cited in 2025 reported about 28,700 fatalities, including over 7,500 civilians killed in direct attacks, with other estimates (BBC) putting total deaths potentially as high as 150,000.
Reports argue Emirati arms and support to the RSF, and Saudi support to the army, have “exacerbated” and prolonged the conflict, but they share responsibility with local commanders and other external backers.
Yemen (Saudi‑ and UAE‑led coalition vs Houthis, with Iran backing Houthis)
The Yemen war is widely described as a major proxy confrontation between Saudi Arabia/UAE and Iran, with each side supporting local armed groups.
One 2024 review of proxy wars notes Yemen as among the “most devastating” current proxy wars, with “around 100,000 killed in the last five years of war” and enormous humanitarian fallout, though this figure includes all sides and does not isolate deaths strictly from Gulf or Iranian support.
Syria (Saudi, Qatar, UAE, Iran, Turkey, U.S., Russia all backing different factions)
The Syrian civil war, a textbook multi‑state proxy battleground, has produced enormous human costs. The Syria Observatory for Human Rights reported about 560,000 deaths over seven years from 2011–2018, many civilian.
A policy paper on GCC foreign assistance notes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE were all implicated in financing extremist networks in Syria after 2011, even as they later tightened controls.
Horn of Africa and neighboring conflicts (Ethiopia/Tigray, Somalia, Libya, etc.)
The UAE has been cited as supplying drones and training to the Ethiopian government during the Tigray conflict, and supporting various factions in Libya and Somalia, contributing to battle outcomes and prolongation of wars, though casualty counts are usually reported at the conflict level, not broken down by external patron.
Because these wars feature overlapping backers and complex local dynamics, credible researchers warn against simple “X state caused Y deaths” statements; rather, Gulf and Iranian support often enables and intensifies conflicts that already exist, significantly raising lethality and duration, but in conjunction with many other actors.
Why precise attribution is difficult
Casualty databases (ACLED, Syria Observatory, UN, etc.) track who was killed, where, and by which armed actor, not which foreign state financed which bullet or missile.
Funding is often covert or deniable, routed through charities, intelligence services, or private intermediaries, making quantitative links between specific financial flows and specific deaths highly uncertain.
Many conflicts (Yemen, Syria, Sudan) have multiple foreign backers on each side, plus local war economies, so responsibility is diffuse and political narratives about blame are contested.tcf+1
Takeaway
Multiple Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, among others) and Iran have, at various times, funded or armed violent groups or partner forces in other countries, especially in Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and parts of the Horn of Africa.
These proxy involvements are associated with wars that have caused tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of deaths each, but current evidence does not support a precise, state‑by‑state casualty ledger; instead, their role is best understood as part of broader proxy war systems that massively increase human costs.
Multiple Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, among others) and Iran have, at various times, funded or armed violent groups or partner forces in other countries, especially in Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and parts of the Horn of Africa.
These proxy involvements are associated with wars that have caused tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of deaths each, but current evidence does not support a precise, state‑by‑state casualty ledger; instead, their role is best understood as part of broader proxy war systems that massively increase human costs.
Source: Perplexity.ai was sourced for the above material
Excellent synopsis of a very complex issue. Thanks for posting this.
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