Even though it does not specifically mention tariffs, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA)202 gives the President extensive economic powers in a national emergency declared under the National Emergencies Act (NEA),203 including to "regulate" or "prohibit" imports.204
Presidents have invoked IEEPA on many occasions to impose sanctions such as asset freezes and prohibitions on unlicensed transactions directed to foreign countries, entities, and individuals,205 although no President had used IEEPA to impose tariffs until this year.
In February 2025, President Trump invoked IEEPA as a basis to impose tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the PRC,206. In his executive orders invoking IEEPA, President Trump proclaimed national emergencies relating to illegal immigration and illicit drugs.208
The President may use IEEPA's authorities "to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."209
The President may use IEEPA's authorities "to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."209
The NEA authorizes the President to declare a national emergency and requires that "[s]uch proclamation shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register."210
Courts typically give some deference to the President's determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat under IEEPA. One federal court, noting the government's interest in national security, stated that courts "owe unique deference to the executive branch's determination that we face 'an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security' of the United States."211
Courts typically give some deference to the President's determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat under IEEPA. One federal court, noting the government's interest in national security, stated that courts "owe unique deference to the executive branch's determination that we face 'an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security' of the United States."211
Another court, faced with a challenge to an IEEPA emergency declaration regarding access of foreign parties to U.S. goods and technology, opined that the court "cannot question the President's political decision to deem this threat 'unusual and extraordinary.'"212
Some scholars argue that IEEPA and Section 232, by empowering the President to impose tariffs in response to purported national security threats, have eroded the distinction between Congress's constitutional power over tariffs and foreign commerce and the President's national security and foreign affairs powers, ceding too much control over tariffs to the President.213
The NEA provides that an emergency may be terminated either by presidential proclamation or by enactment into law of a joint resolution of Congress.214
The NEA provides that an emergency may be terminated either by presidential proclamation or by enactment into law of a joint resolution of Congress.214
In addition, a declared emergency automatically terminates on its anniversary unless the President notifies Congress within the 90 days prior to the anniversary that the emergency is to continue and publishes that notice in the Federal Register;215 provided these notifications are made, the emergency may continue indefinitely.216
IEEPA also requires the President to make regular reports to Congress.217
Some commentators have criticized the use of IEEPA to impose tariffs on the grounds that it may be used to circumvent the substantive and procedural limits found in other, more targeted tariff authorities.218 As explained in this report, some of those authorities require an executive agency to conduct an investigation and make predicate findings before the President or the agency may raise tariffs, and some limit the duration or magnitude of any tariffs.219
Some commentators have criticized the use of IEEPA to impose tariffs on the grounds that it may be used to circumvent the substantive and procedural limits found in other, more targeted tariff authorities.218 As explained in this report, some of those authorities require an executive agency to conduct an investigation and make predicate findings before the President or the agency may raise tariffs, and some limit the duration or magnitude of any tariffs.219
The President's broad latitude to declare national emergencies under IEEPA may obviate the need for the President to rely on trade-specific laws and thereby vitiate their constraints on executive action.220 More generally, the possible lack of judicially enforceable standards as to what may constitute a national emergency may give the President practically unlimited authority to impose tariffs.
On the other hand, some commentators argue that, in addition to serving other economic and policy functions, tariffs may provide leverage for the United States in international negotiations. For tariffs to serve this function, one commentator reasoned, "the executive needs flexibility to act, without waiting for Congress."221 On this view, the flexibility and speed afforded by IEEPA might be seen as helping the President to conduct foreign policy effectively.
Source: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress written by Christopher T. Zirpoli, February 27, 2025
On the other hand, some commentators argue that, in addition to serving other economic and policy functions, tariffs may provide leverage for the United States in international negotiations. For tariffs to serve this function, one commentator reasoned, "the executive needs flexibility to act, without waiting for Congress."221 On this view, the flexibility and speed afforded by IEEPA might be seen as helping the President to conduct foreign policy effectively.
Source: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress written by Christopher T. Zirpoli, February 27, 2025
Excellent summary.
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